The new forms of cooperation between Western firms and East European enterprises, begun with so much optimism in the 1970s, have disappointed the expectations placed in them, In both East and West the question as to the benefits and risks of this particular form of collaboration is now being posed, This article seeks to explain the present situation and to draw some conclusions concerning future trends,
I
n parallel with the volatile growth in East-West trade in the first half of the 1970s the new forms of cooperation between Western firms and socialist enterprises in Eastern Europe became increasingly important. Towards the end of the 1970s, however, the expansion of industrial East-West cooperation had already lost its impetus. During that single decade the Federal Republic of Germany was able to increase the number of cooperation agreements with partners from the CMEA nations from around 300 to more than 500 whereby the geographical pattern of the agreements underwent a marked change. The proportion of Hungarian projects grew from one-third to well over onehalf 1 while the proportion of PoLish projects fell from just under one-third to around one-fifth of all the cooperation arrangements involving German concerns because the net increase in German-Polish cooperation projects was relatively slight and many cooperation agreements had expired bythe end of the decade. Over the ten years little change probably occurred in the total number of agreements with Romania, Czechoslovakia, the USSR, Bulgaria and the German Democratic Republic but in terms of individual countries there was a shift towards the Soviet Union and Bulgaria.
Signs of Stagnation in Cooperation with Hungary
The signs of stagnation in East-West cooperation in the early 1980s are now also perceptible in the case of Hungary, where they might not have been expected because that country has been able to achieve a comparatively satisfactory economic development and has successfully pushed ahead with its economic reform. In addition, Hungary's political relations with all * HWWA-Instttut fL~r Wtrtschaftsforschung-Hamburg. The development in the total number of cooperation agreements in the previous years had continued to show considerable growth from year to year. Yet, when interpreting those figures, we must bear in mind that they also include cooperation with Yugoslavia and, possibly, other countries which cannot be counted as Western nations; in other words, if the number of cooperation agreements with the Western nations (unfortunately no data is available) were considered in isolation, that downward trend may perhaps have begun before 1982. When the cooperation projects with Yugoslavia and other countries are included, cooperation was virtually stagnant in 1982, i.e. in absolute terms the number of contracts increased only by 4 to 508.
If the total number of agreements and the number of new agreements concluded each year (1978, 53; 1979, 54; 1980, 79; 1981,56; 1982, 74) 
Hungary's Foreign Trade
When developments in the trade turnover linked with cooperation, are compared with the total number of cooperation agreements, neither imports nor exports \ appear to have developed in proportion to the number of agreements; in most years, imports and exports lag behind the growth in the number of cooperation agreements. Although the total number of cooperation agreements was stagnant in 1982 -despite a relatively large number of new agreements-Hungary had no real reason to complain because in that year it managed to increase the exports generated by cooperation by some 600 million Forint while imports from the West actually fell by some 150 million Forint. It is evident that new cooperation agreements concluded in previous years did not produce exports until 1982. Not only does this result provide some evidence about the functioning of cooperation agreements even during a period of economic recession; it also reflects the Hungarian efficiency in domestic and foreign trade.
As mentioned above, the Federal Republic of Germany was the leading country in 1982 with 224 agreements. 3 Yet if the Hungarian imports and exports caused by cooperation are taken as the criteria for determining the various countries' positions, Yugoslavia with a turnover of 3.9 billion Forint outstrips the Federal Republic and is the main Hungarian partner in cooperation. The large Hungarian surpluses on imports from Yugoslavia can probably be explained by Yugoslav-Hungarian cooperation projects on Yugoslav territory which mainly help to improve supplies to consumers in Hungary, as in the case of cosmetics which are often almost up to western standards owing to Yugoslavia's cooperation with western countries in that sector.
Although Hungarian expectations concerning the expansion of exports deriving from cooperation may not always have been fulfilled, it is nonetheless true that the annual balance Of the imports and exports resulting from cooperation has been in Hungary's favour, due -at least in 1982 -especially to the import/export ratio with the Federal Republic of Germany. Yet, the development of imports and exports as such shows rather clearly that Hungary has so far been unable to achieve any real breakthrough in its exports to the West on the basis of cooperation. The figures also show, and particularly in relation to the Federal Republic-since German exports of some 1.3 billion Forint compare with imports of 2.4 billion Forint from Hungary -that the Western nations have also set their own export targets much too high. Yet, if it is evident that cooperation does not provide both sides with the broad expansions of the market which were hoped for when cooperation was agreed, the present greatly diminished interest in concluding further cooperation agreements is understandable.
Other countries' imports and exports generated by cooperation are well behind those of the Federal Republic (see Table 2 ) and their placings are different from those based on the number of cooperation agreements. S o u r c e : Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Trade (taken from Nachrichten fur AuSenhandel (NfA), 11.11. 1983, p. 5).
